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Perfect 10 v. Visa: The Future of Contributory Copyright
Infringement
I. Introduction
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court noted that “[f]rom its beginning,
the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in
technology.” 1 In fact, it was the invention of a new technology—the printing
press—that necessitated copyright protection in the first place. 2 Advances in
technology, particularly on the Internet, have led to new methods of copyright
infringement hardly imaginable two decades ago,3 and these new methods of
infringement threaten copyright holders “as never before.” 4 Consequently, as
technology leads to new methods of infringement, copyright owners seek new
methods of protecting their property interests.
In an age of global technology, it is often impractical, if not impossible, for
copyright owners to successfully pursue direct infringers.5 A website hosted
in Bangkok can be found online just as easily as one hosted in Boston.6 Both
jurisdictional and practical concerns have led copyright holders to seek
methods of protection with greater efficiency than simply filing suit against
those directly involved in copyright infringement.7
Copyright owners have found some avail in a recent line of cases that have
held parties other than direct infringers liable under theories of contributory
copyright infringement and vicarious copyright infringement.8 While there has
1. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984).
2. Id.
3. Kevin Michael Lemley, Comment, Protecting Consumers from Themselves: Alleviating
the Market Inequalities Created by Online Copyright Infringement in the Entertainment
Industry, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 613, 639 (2003) (noting that the Internet has “provided
infringers with new methods of infringement”).
4. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928-29 (2005).
5. Benjamin H. Glatstein, Comment, Tertiary Copyright Liability, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
1605, 1626 (2004) (“[N]ew technologies that mask the identity of direct infringers may make
recovery and deterrence against direct infringers impossible, or at least extremely difficult and
costly. In the arena of digital copyright infringement, many users are judgment-proof,
effectively limiting the ability of standard copyright law to deter their behavior.” (footnote
omitted)).
6. Id. (“[M]any infringers will respond to the jurisdictional limitations of U.S. courts by
moving their infringing activity—or just enough of their infringing activity to avoid
liability—overseas.”).
7. Id. (“The specter of judgment-proof direct infringers and jurisdictionally immune
secondary infringers militates in favor of tertiary liability.”).
8. Mohsen Manesh, The Immorality of Theft, the Amorality of Infringement, 2006 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 5, ¶ 19 (2006) (“Napster litigation appeared to be a significant success for
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been significant success in dealing with such infringement in peer-to-peer file
sharing programs such as Napster9 and Grokster, 10 a recent decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has foreclosed a whole
industry from potential responsibility in online copyright infringement. 11 In
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa International Service, Ass’n,12 decided by a split panel
on July 3, 2007, the Ninth Circuit held that “credit card companies cannot be
said to materially contribute to . . . infringement . . . because they have no
direct connection to that infringement.” 13 The Perfect 10 v. Visa holding
represents an inaccurate reading of the United States Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,14 as well as
a misguided balancing of equities in the field of copyright law. The Ninth
Circuit’s holding in Perfect 10 v. Visa puts copyright owners at a severe
disadvantage in protecting their property rights in this new technological field.
Courts should examine not only the soundness of the legal principles behind
the decision, but the consequences it will have on intellectual property in the
future.
To better understand the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Perfect 10 v. Visa, Part II
of this note will explore the development of copyright infringement law in the
United States. Part III will examine the background and facts of Perfect 10 v.
Visa, the majority’s analysis and arguments, and the dissent’s criticism of the
decision. Part IV analyzes the court’s decision and its implications on the
future of copyright law and the Internet. Part V concludes this note.
II. The Evolution of Copyright Law
The law of contributory copyright infringement has changed dramatically
since its inception in the common law almost one hundred years ago. 15 Having
to apply old legal maxims to cutting edge technologies, courts have remained
one step behind the latest methods of infringement. 16 These changes in the law
copyright owners.”).
9. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
10. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
11. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv., Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 798 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that payment processing by credit card companies does not constitute contributory
copyright infringement).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 796 (emphasis added).
14. 545 U.S. at 913.
15. See Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911) (representing the birth of the law
of contributory copyright infringement).
16. Lisa A. Flate, Note, New Technology Clauses Aren’t Broad Enough: Why a New
Standard of Interpretation Must be Adopted for Internet Distribution, 23 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 171, 188 (2000) (“[T]echnology continues to outpace intellectual property law.”).
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have at times benefited copyright owners, and at other times copyright users.17
This section will explore the origins and history of copyright law, contributory
copyright infringement, and recent changes in the law preceding the Ninth
Circuit’s Perfect 10 v. Visa decision.
A. Origins of Copyright Law in the United States
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,18 the United States
Supreme Court summarized the underlying rationale behind the protection of
copyrights, stating that “[t]he sole interest of the United States and the primary
object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors.” 19 Protection, therefore, lies in the interests
of the public, not in the authors’ interests,20 as the “reward to the author or
artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative
genius.” 21
Copyright law in the United States is predicated on the Intellectual Property
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 22 stating that “Congress shall have Power . . .
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.” 23 There was little discussion of the clause during
either the drafting of the Constitution or the ratification process, making the
intent of the Framers difficult to determine.24 Two conclusions to be drawn

17. Mary L. Mills, Note, New Technology and the Limitations of Copyright Law: An
Argument for Finding Alternatives to Copyright Legislation in an Era of Rapid Technological
Change, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 307, 310 (1989) (“Changes in technology tend to upset the
balance set by copyright law in favor of either the copyright owner, who may be able to exclude
others from his work more effectively, or the user, who may make use of some technological
innovation to access or exploit more easily a protected work.”).
18. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
19. Id. at 429 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
20. Id. (“The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary
consideration.” (quoting Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 158)).
21. Id. (quoting Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 158).
22. Edward C. Walterscheid, The Nature of the Intellectual Property Clause: A Study in
Historical Perspective (Part 1), 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 763, 765 n.1 (2001)
(“This clause is frequently referred to as either the patent clause, the copyright clause, or the
intellectual property clause, depending on the context in which it is being discussed.”).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24. Walterscheid, supra note 22, at 766 (“The almost total lack of discussion in the federal
convention was followed by an equal lack of discussion in the ratifying conventions. It received
only the briefest of mention and there was no opposition to it. The impression is left that it was
one of those innocuous and straightforward clauses which failed to raise the passions or
concerns of anyone in the debates on either the content of the Constitution or its ratification.”
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from the lack of debate over the clause are that it was either uncontroversial
or simply unimportant. 25
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, copyright protection is provided for
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” 26
A copyright begins at the time of creation and endures for the life of the author
and seventy years after the author’s death. 27 Under the Act, “[a]nyone who
violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . or of the
author . . . is an infringer of the copyright . . . .” 28 While this protection does
not give the copyright owner complete control over all of the uses of his work,
it grants the copyright owner “exclusive” rights to use and authorize the use
of his work in five ways, including reproduction and sale.29 To establish direct
copyright infringement, one must prove both: “(1) ownership of a valid
copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are
original.” 30
B. Origins of Common Law Contributory Copyright Infringement
The United States Supreme Court first recognized a form of contributory
copyright infringement in 1911.31 The case, Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros.,
involved a motion picture production company that released a film entitled
Ben Hur. This film was based, without permission, on a novel written by
General Lew Wallace.32 The production company did not commercially
exhibit the film, but rather sold the film to third parties to exhibit publicly. 33
The Court held that even though the production company “did not produce the
representations, but merely sold the films,” 34 the production company could
still be held liable for the infringement. 35 The production company’s liability
was based on intentional infringement through advertisements.36 As the court

(footnote omitted)); see also Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional
Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272, 338 (2004).
25. Nachbar, supra note 24, at 338.
26. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
27. Id. § 302(a) (“Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists from
its creation and, except as provided by the following subsections, endures for a term consisting
of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death.”).
28. Id. § 501(a).
29. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432-33 (1984).
30. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
31. Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911).
32. Id. at 60.
33. Sony, 464 U.S. at 435 (citing Kalem, 222 U.S. at 62).
34. Kalem, 222 U.S. at 62.
35. Id. at 63.
36. Id. at 62-63.
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stated, “[i]f the [production company] did not contribute to the infringement
it is impossible to do so except by taking part in the final act. It is liable on
principles recognized in every part of the law.” 37
The doctrine of contributory copyright infringement originates in tort law.38
The doctrine “stems from the notion that one who directly contributes to
another’s infringement should be held accountable.” 39 As articulated by the
United States Supreme Court, “the concept of contributory infringement is
merely a species of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in
which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of another.” 40
Judge Posner, of the Seventh Circuit, provides a more pragmatic reason for
contributory copyright law:
Recognizing the impracticability or futility of a copyright owner’s
suing a multitude of individual infringers (“chasing individual
consumers is time consuming and is a teaspoon solution to an
ocean problem”), the law allows a copyright holder to sue a
contributor to the infringement instead, in effect as an aider and
abettor. 41
The modern adaptation of contributory copyright infringement has largely
been spawned from a test given by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in 1971, stating that “one who, with knowledge of the
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing
conduct of another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer.” 42 This
test has been modified by many courts over the years, but was a starting point
for the United States Supreme Court when they confronted the issue of
contributory copyright infringement and emerging technologies in Sony Corp.
of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.43

37. Id. at 63 (citing Rupp & Wittgenfeld Co. v. Elliot, 131 F. 730, 732 (6th Cir. 1904)).
38. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).
39. Id.; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417
(1984).
40. Sony, 464 U.S. at 435.
41. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645-46 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted)
(quoting Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47
ANTITRUST BULL. 423, 442 (2002)).
42. Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971) (footnote omitted).
43. 464 U.S. at 487.
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C. Sony: The United States Supreme Court’s First Attempt at Secondary
Copyright Liability and New Technology
The Sony case appeared before the United States Supreme Court in 1984.
The issue arose out of the manufacture and sale of Sony’s Betamax video tape
recorder (VTR).44 Universal City Studios owned copyrights on several
television programs that were broadcast over public airwaves. 45 Some
members of the public used VTRs sold by Sony to record these copyrighted
programs.46 The Court addressed the issue of whether Sony could be held
contributory liable for an individual third party’s copyright infringement
carried out by use of its product.47
Balancing the needs of both copyright law and emerging technologies, the
Court found that Sony was not liable for copyright infringement.48 The Court
framed the issue by stating that “[i]f vicarious liability is to be imposed on
Sony in this case, it must rest on the fact that it has sold equipment with
constructive knowledge of the fact that its customers may use that equipment
to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material.” 49 Based partly on the
public’s interest in access to the article of commerce in question, 50 the Court
adopted the “staple article of commerce doctrine” from patent law. 51 The
staple article of commerce doctrine holds that an article of commerce, such as
the Betamax, “does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is
widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely
be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.” 52
Applying this test, the Court concluded that the Betamax was “capable of
substantial noninfringing uses” and that the “sale of such equipment to the
general public does not constitute contributory infringement of respondent’s
copyrights.” 53 By finding Sony not liable for contributory copyright
infringement, the Court allowed producers of emerging technologies to place
a new product on the market without fear of suit.54 Even if the producer has
knowledge of possible infringing uses of their new technology, they are not

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 420.
Id. at 419-20.
Id. at 420.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 456.
Id. at 439.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 442.
Id.
Id. at 456.
Id.
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liable for contributory copyright infringement as long as the product is capable
of “substantial noninfringing uses.” 55
D. Fonovisa: the Ninth Circuit’s Pre-Napster Take on Contributory
Copyright Infringement
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.56 was the first post-Sony contributory
copyright infringement case considered by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit. Fonovisa, a collection of music copyright owners, sued
Cherry Auction, Inc., the owner and operator of a swap meet “where customers
c[a]me to purchase various merchandise from individual vendors.” 57 While
Cherry Auction did not directly violate any Fonovisa copyrights, the
undisputed facts showed that it was “aware vendors in their swap meet were
selling counterfeit recordings in violation of Fonovisa’s trademarks and
copyrights.” 58
The main issue for the court was whether Cherry Auction’s furnishing of
space and services to its vendors was a “material contribution” to their
infringement.59 The court found “that providing the site and facilities for
known infringing activity is sufficient to establish contributory liability” 60 and
specifically pointed to Cherry Auction’s knowledge of the infringing activities
and their support services, such as providing space and parking for the
infringing businesses.61
E. The Ninth Circuit in a Digital Age
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. was the first major case in the Ninth
Circuit to deal with the issue of contributory copyright infringement on the
Internet. 62 The plaintiffs were “engaged in the commercial recording,
distribution and sale of copyrighted musical compositions and sound
recordings.” 63 Napster produced a peer-to-peer file sharing program that
allowed users throughout the world to share music files over the Internet.64
These files were stored and transmitted between individual Napster users’
computers.65 Napster never actually stored any of these files on its computers,
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 442.
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 261.
Id.
Id. at 264.
Id.
Id.
239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1010-11.
Id. at 1011.
Id.
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but it stored a list of the filenames that its users had made available over the
network to other users.66 There was no question that third party users routinely
used Napster’s software to infringe on the plaintiffs’ copyrights.67
On the issue of contributory copyright infringement, the court focused on
Napster’s knowledge of68 and material contribution to 69 direct infringement by
its users. As to the knowledge element, the court found that Napster had both
actual and constructive knowledge of direct infringement.70 Because Napster
had access to a list of filenames its users made available over the network, the
company had knowledge of specific infringing material on its system and
failed to purge such material, amounting to a knowing contribution of direct
infringement.71
The Napster court next disposed of the material contribution issue, relying
on Fonovisa.72 Agreeing with the district court, the Ninth Circuit found that,
like the swap meet in Fonovisa, Napster provided users with “‘the site and
facilities’ for direct infringement.” 73 Because Napster had both actual and
constructive knowledge of the infringing activities, in addition to its material
contribution to this activity, the Ninth Circuit had little difficulty holding
Napster liable for contributory copyright infringement.74
F. Aimster: The Seventh Circuit’s Take on Peer-to-Peer Networks and
Contributory Copyright Infringement
The In re Aimster Copyright Litigation 75 case is factually similar to the
Napster case in the Ninth Circuit, based on a peer-to-peer file sharing program
that allowed users throughout the world to share music and video files over the

66. Id. at 1011-12.
67. Id. at 1013. (“[A]s much as eighty-seven percent of the files available on Napster may
be copyrighted and more than seventy percent may be owned or administered by plaintiffs.”
(quoting A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 911 (N.D. Cal. 2000))).
68. Id. at 1020 (“Contributory liability requires that the secondary infringer ‘know or have
reason to know’ of direct infringement.” (quoting Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. Network
Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 845-46 (11th Cir. 1990))).
69. Id. at 1022.
70. Id. at 1020 (“It is apparent from the record that Napster has knowledge, both actual and
constructive, of direct infringement.” (footnote omitted)).
71. Id. at 1021 (“[I]f a computer system operator learns of specific infringing material
available on his system and fails to purge such material from the system, the operator knows
of and contributes to direct infringement.”).
72. Id. at 1022 (“The district court correctly applied the reasoning in Fonovisa, and
properly found that Napster materially contributes to direct infringement.”).
73. Id. (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996)).
74. Id. at 1022.
75. 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
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Internet. 76 Both cases had similar parties and a similar result, but the reasoning
of the Seventh Circuit substantially differed from that of the Napster court. 77
Written by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit approached this case with an
eye toward balancing the interests of both emerging technologies and
copyright holders, reasoning that “when a supplier is offering a product or
service that has noninfringing as well as infringing uses, some estimate of the
respective magnitudes of these uses is necessary for a finding of contributory
infringement.” 78 The court found that the Ninth Circuit erred in Napster by
“suggesting that actual knowledge of specific infringing uses is a sufficient
condition for deeming a facilitator a contributory infringer.” 79
In the decision, the evidence showed that there was a possibility of
substantial noninfringing use, but Aimster failed to show that any of these
potential uses were actualized by its users.80 The court found that
[e]ven when there are noninfringing uses of an Internet filesharing service . . . if the infringing uses are substantial then to
avoid liability as a contributory infringer the provider of the service
must show that it would have been disproportionately costly for
him to eliminate or at least reduce substantially the infringing
uses.81
Because Aimster could not show that its product was actually used for any
noninfringing use,82 and likewise could not show that any possible measures
to stop infringement would be disproportionately costly, the court found that
Aimster’s activity fell outside of the protection offered to producers of
emerging technologies afforded by the Sony decision.83
G. Grokster: Technology Adapts, So Does the Supreme Court
In the wake of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits’ attempts at divining the true
meaning of Sony in a new digital era, the United States Supreme Court
attempted to lay a framework for such cases.84 The facts of the Grokster
76. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011.
77. Tom Graves, Note, Picking Up the Pieces of Grokster: A New Approach to File
Sharing, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 137, 159 (2004) (“Aimster’s subsequent limitation
of Sony differs greatly from the heightened knowledge requirement imposed by Napster.”).
78. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 649.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 653.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Alfred C. Yen, Third-Party Copyright Liability After Grokster, 91 MINN. L. REV. 184,
189 (2006) (analyzing Grokster and arguing that it “created an improved framework for future
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decision were in essence very similar to Napster, but with one major
difference.85 Grokster did not have a database of files available on a corporate
computer, but rather all information relating to what files were available over
their network was stored on the individual users’ computers. 86 This, according
to Grokster, differentiated their software from Napster, in that they only
provided software capable of both infringing and non-infringing uses. 87 Also,
unlike Napster, they had no actual or constructive knowledge of specific acts
of infringement.88
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that
Grokster was not liable for contributory copyright infringement, even though
the undisputed facts showed that their users were liable. 89 For the Ninth
Circuit, the fact that the software was capable of substantial noninfringing uses
meant that Grokster was “not liable, because they had no such actual
knowledge, owing to the decentralized architecture of their software.” 90
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, finding that “this case is significantly different from Sony and
reliance on that case . . . was error.” 91 The Court held that when the “evidence
goes beyond a product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to
infringing uses, and shows statements or actions [such as found here by
Grokster] directed to promoting infringement, Sony’s staple-article rule will
not preclude liability.” 92 Although there were some potential non-infringing
uses, the evidence in the Grokster decision established that the majority of
Grokster’s profits were based on the infringing uses. Therefore, the noninfringing uses were not substantial.93
The Court also distinguished Sony from Grokster in another important way.
Sony put a product on the market with constructive knowledge of possibly
infringing uses.94 Grokster, on the other hand, actively promoted their product
for infringing uses.95 Even though the two products might have had similar
possibilities for both infringing and noninfringing uses, Grokster’s intent and

construction of third-party copyright liability”).
85. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 922 (2005).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 922-23.
88. Id. at 923.
89. Id. at 928.
90. Id. at 927-28.
91. Id. at 941.
92. Id. at 935.
93. Id. at 941.
94. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984).
95. Grokster, 545 U.S at 924-25, 941.
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actual knowledge of infringing activity prompted the Court to rule against
them.
H. Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com: Reconciling Grokster and Napster
The Ninth Circuit’s first opportunity to align its contributory copyright
jurisprudence with the United States Supreme Court’s Grokster decision arose
in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.96 The Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com
decision involved the same plaintiff as in the Perfect 10 v. Visa case, who also
filed suit against Amazon.com and Google.com for, inter alia, contributory
copyright infringement.97 The plaintiff’s claim in Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com
was that Google had continued to show thumbnail photos in its web searches
that were copyrighted by Perfect 10.98 Perfect 10 also alleged that Google
continued to show Perfect 10’s thumbnail photos despite the fact that Google
had actual knowledge of these photos, as well as knowledge that the websites
that hosted them were infringing on the plaintiff’s copyrights.99 The district
court enjoined Google from creating and displaying thumbnail versions of
Perfect 10’s images, but did not enjoin their ability to link to third-party
infringing websites.100
Upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit framed the issue of contributory copyright
infringement in the words of the United States Supreme Court’s Grokster
decision, noting that “[o]ne infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing
or encouraging direct infringement . . . .” 101 As the Ninth Circuit found direct
infringement with relative ease, 102 the real test for Google was whether it
intentionally induced or encouraged this infringement. 103 Reading common
law tort rules into the Grokster decision, the court stated that “under Grokster,
an actor may be contributorily liable for intentionally encouraging direct
infringement if the actor knowingly takes steps that are substantially certain
to result in such direct infringement.”104
Applying this test, the court held that
[t]here is no dispute that Google substantially assists websites to
distribute their infringing copies to a worldwide market and assists
96. 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007).
97. Id. at 713.
98. Id. at 710.
99. Id. at 713.
100. Id. at 710.
101. Id. at 725 (emphasis added) (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005)).
102. See id. at 717.
103. Id. at 727.
104. Id. (emphasis added).
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a worldwide audience of users to access infringing materials. . . .
Google could be held contributorily liable if it had knowledge that
infringing Perfect 10 images were available using its search engine,
could take simple measures to prevent further damage to Perfect
10’s copyrighted works, and failed to take such steps.105
Questions remained, however, as to Google’s actual knowledge of
infringing activity and their ability to feasibly stop such infringement, and the
case was remanded to the district court to determine the adequacy of Perfect
10’s notice to Google.106 The Ninth Circuit soon revisited the issue of
contributory copyright infringment in Perfect 10 v. Visa.
III. Perfect 10 v. Visa
A. Facts
Perfect 10, Inc. publishes “PERFECT10” magazine and operates the
subscription website www.perfect10.com. 107 Both of these products feature,
as described by Perfect 10, “tasteful copyrighted images of the world’s most
beautiful natural models.” 108 Perfect 10 claims copyrights in the photographs
both in the magazine and on the website, and alleged that “numerous websites
based in several countries have stolen its proprietary images . . . and illegally
offered them for sale online.” 109
Instead of suing the direct infringers of its copyrights, however, Perfect 10
decided to sue Visa International Service, Ass’n, MasterCard International,
Inc., and several affiliated banks and data processing services.110 The
defendants’ customers allegedly used the defendants’ credit cards to purchase
infringing images on foreign websites. 111 The defendants admitted to receiving
repeated notices from Perfect 10 informing them of the infringing websites and
their customers’ activities, but they took no action in response to these
notices.112
After failing to receive a response to its repeated notices, Perfect 10 filed
suit on January 28, 2004, alleging, inter alia, contributory and vicarious
copyright infringement.113 The defendants quickly moved to dismiss the case
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 729.
Id.
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv., Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 792.
Id. at 793.
Id.
Id.
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under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. 114 The district court granted the defendants’ motion, dismissing the
case with prejudice.115 Perfect 10 appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, who, by a 2-1 panel vote, upheld the
dismissal.116
The issue for the Ninth Circuit, therefore, was whether Perfect 10 could
“prove no set of facts in support of [its] claim which would entitle [them] to
relief” 117 under a theory of contributory copyright infringement for knowingly
processing credit card transactions that assisted the violation of Perfect 10’s
copyrights.
B. The Majority’s Holding: Very New and Very Bad Law
The court began their discussion of the contributory copyright infringement
claim with a brief history of recent cases in the field of copyright law.118
Attempting to reconcile Ninth Circuit case law with the recent United States
Supreme Court decision in Grokster,119 the court held that these cases are all
“non-contradictory variations on the same basic test.” 120 The court went on to
outline the test for contributory copyright infringement, stating that “one
contributorily infringes when he (1) has knowledge of another’s infringement
and (2) either (a) materially contributes to or (b) induces that infringement.”121
Here, taking into consideration the Grokster and Amazon.com decisions, the
court bifurcated the second prong of contributory liability into an either
“materially contributes” or “induces” standard.122
The court refused to address the first prong of the test, noting that because
“Perfect 10 has not pled facts sufficient to establish that Defendants induce or
materially contribute to the infringing activity . . . we need not address the
Defendants’ knowledge of the infringing activity.” 123 Although the court was
disinclined to address Perfect 10’s claim under the first prong of the test, it
seems almost certain that they would have prevailed. As the court states
elsewhere, Perfect 10 not only alleged that it sent the defendants notice of the
infringing activities, but also that “[d]efendants admit[ted to] receiving some
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 810.
117. Id. at 794 (internal citations omitted in original) (quoting Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314
F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2002)).
118. Id. at 794-95.
119. Id. at 795.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 795, 801-02.
123. Id. at 795.
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of these notices.” 124 Because the defendants readily admitted to receiving
notice of the direct infringers’ activities, they almost certainly had the
knowledge required under the first prong of the contributory infringement test.
Turning next to the second prong of the contributory infringement test, the
court began its analysis with the “material contribution” sub-prong. 125 In
finding that the defendants’ activities did not amount to a material contribution
to infringing activities, the court articulated several rationales for their
holding. 126 First, the court noted the lack of a “direct connection” to the
infringement.127 Acknowledging that the credit card services of the defendants
made infringement more profitable and, therefore, encouraged consumers to
engage in such infringing activity, the court nonetheless found that this was
not enough for material contribution.128 The question the court addressed was
whether the defendants materially contributed to the infringing activities.129
These infringing activities consisted of “reproduction, alteration, display and
distribution, which can occur without payment. Even if infringing images
were not paid for, there would still be infringement.”130
In this case, according to the court, there was an additional step in the casual
chain.131 The “Defendants make it easier for infringement to be profitable,
which tends to increase financial incentives to infringe, which in turn tends to
increase infringement.” 132 This extra step led the court to find that there was
not a sufficiently direct connection to allege a material contribution to
infringing activities.133 For the court, the distinction was mainly one of
location services versus payment services. 134 They found that “location
services are more important and more essential—indeed, more ‘material’—to
infringement than payment services are.” 135
Next, the court discussed potential public policy problems with holding that
the defendants’ activities amounted to a material contribution to infringing
activities. 136 Examining the possible implications of such a finding, the court
conjectured that the mere threat of a contributory infringement suit could lead
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 793.
Id. at 796.
Id. at 796-800.
Id. at 796.
Id. at 797.
Id.
Id. at 796.
Id. at 797.
Id.
Id. at 796-97.
Id. at 797 n.8.
Id.
Id. at 798 n.9.
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credit card companies to decline to finance purchases that were legally risky,
which could have enormous implications for the economy.137 The court even
went as far as to speculate that such a turn of events could lead to the violation
of consumers’ First Amendment rights.138 These factors, though not
dispositive, explain why the court was reluctant to apply contributory
infringement against the defendants in this case.
The court went on to compare the circumstances in Fonovisa to the current
case.139 According to the court, “[t]he Fonovisa court found liability because
the swap meet operator knowingly provided the ‘site and facilities’ for the
infringing activity.” 140 The court found that the “site and facilities” increased
the level of infringement by providing a centralized location for the exchange
of infringing works. 141 According to the court, there was no way to reconcile
the facts of Perfect 10 with those of Fonovia and Napster without broadening
the concept of “site and facilities” beyond recognition.142 The defendants in
this case “merely provide a method of payment, not a ‘site’ or ‘facility’ of
infringement.”143
Turning to the second sub-prong in the contributory infringement analysis,
the court examined possible inducement by applying Grokster to the current
case.144
Perfect 10 claimed that “Grokster [was] analogous because
Defendants induce customers to use their cards to purchase goods and services,
and are therefore guilty of specifically inducing infringement if the cards are
used to purchase images from sites that have content stolen from Perfect
10.” 145 Disagreeing with this argument, the court noted that there were no
affirmative steps taken by the defendants to specifically promote the payment
system as a means to infringe and that Perfect 10 had failed to allege any
specific acts intended to encourage or induce infringement.146 Providing credit
card services alone did not establish that the defendants intended to induce
customers to purchase infringing items.147 In the court’s view, “it does not
follow that Defendants affirmatively promote each product that their cards are
used to purchase.” 148
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 798.
Id.
Id. at 799.
Id. at 799-800.
Id. at 800.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 801-02.
Id. at 800-01.
Id. at 801.
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As a result of Perfect 10’s failure to meet either the material contribution
prong or the inducement prong of the Ninth Circuit’s contributory copyright
infringement test, they failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. 149 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s
dismissal of the case.150
C. Dissent
Judge Kozinski filed a lengthy and impassioned dissent to the majority’s
opinion. He argued that if the majority were to take Perfect 10’s allegations
at face value, which the court must on a motion to dismiss, the defendants “are
easily liable for indirect copyright infringement.” 151 Commenting that the
majority’s opinion “leaves our law in disarray,” 152 Judge Kozinski questioned
why the majority “strain[ed] to absolve [the] defendants of liability” in this
case.153
Judge Kozinski assaulted the majority’s reasoning in several ways. First,
he reconciled the Amazon.com case with the current case.154 The court in
Amazon.com noted that Google “could be held contributorily liable if it had
knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 images were available using its search
engine, could take simple measures to prevent further damage to Perfect 10’s
copyrighted works, and failed to take such steps.” 155 Simply by replacing the
words “search engine” with the words “payment systems,” this test would
describe the defendants.156
The majority attempted to distinguish Amazon.com by noting the
“additional step” required in the causal chain, but Judge Kozinski disagreed.157
Finding the defendants’ activities an essential step in the infringing process,
he noted that the “[d]efendants participate[d] in every credit card sale of
pirated images; the images are delivered to the buyer only after [the]
defendants approve[d] the transaction and process[ed] the payment.”158
Judge Kozinski also stated that even if the defendants’ activities did require
an “additional step” to get to contributory infringement, it would be of no
consequence in this case.159 When looking at the material contribution of a
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 810.
Id.
Id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Id. at 811.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 729 (9th Cir. 2007)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 812.
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party’s activities, “[m]ateriality turns on how significantly the activity helps
infringement, not on whether it’s characterized as one step or two steps
removed from it.” 160 Judge Kozinski argued that the majority acknowledged
that the defendants provided substantial assistance to the infringers, but
attempted to distinguish their activities by “consign[ing] the means of payment
to secondary status.” 161
Finding that “[l]ocation services and payment services are equally central
to infringement,” 162 Judge Kozinski questioned why the majority found
locating images more central to infringement than paying for them. 163 If you
cannot find infringing images, there can be no infringement. If the infringing
images cannot be paid for, however, there cannot be infringing activity
either.164 Even if locating images is more central to infringement than
payment, this should have no consequence to the outcome of this case.165 The
question should be whether the contribution is a material one, not whether it
is “more material than” or “as material as” another type of infringement.166
Next, Judge Kozinski attempted to distinguish the practical impacts of
locating images compared to payment systems. 167 First, he noted that this
question is not even a necessary one at this point in the litigation, stating, “At
the pleadings stage, [the court] must accept plaintiff’s allegations that credit
cards are indispensable to the operation of the Stolen Content Websites, and
that these websites would be forced out of business without them.” 168 The fact
that the majority contradicted one of the plaintiffs’ allegations in the pleadings
to justify their opinion was, in Judge Kozinski’s opinion, “a pretty good hint
that they’re wrong.” 169
Even assuming that the court did not accept the plaintiff’s allegations as
true, experience reveals that “there are numerous ways of locating infringing
images on the Internet, but there are no adequate substitutes for credit cards
when it comes to paying for them.” 170 If the court would have honestly
weighed the importance of search engines and credit cards to infringing
activities online, “the cards would win hands down.” 171
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 812, 812 n.6.
Id. at 812 n.6.
Id. at 813.
Id.
Id. at 813-14.
Id. at 814.
Id.
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Further, Judge Kozinski questioned why the majority made the existence of
alternative means of payment a defense to contributory infringement. 172
Noting that the majority “makes some very new—and very bad—law here,” 173
he questioned whether there could ever be a case of contributory infringement
based on material assistance if hypothetical alternatives to the specific means
of assisting infringement could be used to diminish the importance of the
actual assistance given.174
Finally, Judge Kozinski questioned the majority’s distinction between
assisting infringement and making infringement profitable.175 He found that
the majority seemed to think that increasing the profitability of infringement
could not materially assist infringement because the actual process of
infringement does not include payment.176 He found this approach misguided
for two reasons. First, the Stolen Content Websites infringed on Perfect 10’s
right of distribution “by sale.” 177 Because it is not possible to infringe by sale
without receiving compensation, payment is unquestionably an essential
element of infringement by sale. 178 Second, this reading contradicted previous
case law. 179 In Amazon.com, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that
helping users locate infringing images materially assisted infringement, even
though helping users to locate images is not “reproduction, alteration, display
[or] distribution.” 180
In sum, Judge Kozinski stated:
Defendants here are alleged to provide an essential service to
infringers, a service that enables infringement on a massive scale.
Defendants know about the infringements; they profit from them;
they are intimately and causally involved in a vast number of
infringing transactions that could not be consummated if they
refused to process the payments; [and] they have ready means to
stop the infringements.181
In his view, this case should not have even been a close or difficult
decision.182
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2000)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 816.
Id.
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IV. Analysis
The majority in Perfect 10 v. Visa was misguided in their approach to
contributory copyright infringement. To quote Judge Kozinski’s dissent, the
majority “ma[de] some very new—and very bad—law here.” 183 The court has
created a new, stricter standard for contributory copyright infringement that
reduces the protection of copyright holders on the Internet. The Ninth
Circuit’s ruling in Perfect 10 v. Visa is contrary to the plain language and
ordinary interpretation of the rules applied, the public policy and principles
behind the rules, and the economic realities that copyright owners face on an
increasing basis in a digital age.
A. Misapplication of the Rules
As Judge Kozinski noted at length in his dissent, the majority has failed to
apply previous court precedents that “were developed for a brick-and-mortar
world.” 184 The court has instead developed its own test for contributory
copyright infringement that is unsupported by prior case law. By attempting
to shift the argument of materiality from the significance of the assistance
given to the proximity of assistance given through a confusing “one step or
two steps removed” analysis, the majority has failed to apply Ninth Circuit
precedent.185
Less than two months before this ruling was issued, the Ninth Circuit held
in Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com that the test for contributory copyright
infringement was whether one intentionally induced or encouraged direct
infringement.186 Under this interpretation of the United States Supreme
Court’s Grokster opinion, the Ninth Circuit found that “an actor may be
contributorily liable [under Grokster] for intentionally encouraging direct
infringement if the actor knowingly takes steps that are substantially certain
to result in such direct infringement.”187
While failing to apply this test for contributory infringement, the Perfect 10
v. Visa court distinguished their ruling from Amazon.com based on the fact that
the Perfect 10 v. Visa defendants “[did] not provide users the tools to locate
infringing material, nor d[id] any infringing material ever reside on or pass

183. Id. at 814.
184. Id. at 798 n.9.
185. Id. at 812 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
186. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 725 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005)).
187. Perfect 10 v. Visa, 494 F.3d at 795 (emphasis added) (quoting Perfect 10 v.
Amazon.com, 487 F.3d at 727).
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through any network or computer Defendants operate.” 188 Neither of these
matters directly relate to the basic question of contributory copyright
infringement.
The majority in Perfect 10 v. Visa should have simply asked whether the
defendants knowingly took steps that encouraged direct infringement, and
whether these steps were substantially certain to result in direct infringement.
Rather than redefining their own standard for contributory infringement, the
majority should have approached Perfect 10 v. Visa with the same test that the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used in Amazon.com, based on the United
States Supreme Court’s Grokster decision.
Using the Amazon.com analysis, it seems very likely that Visa’s activities
did amount to contributory copyright infringement. Visa admitted to receiving
repeated notices from Perfect 10 informing them of the infringing websites and
their customers’ activities, but Visa took no action in response to these
notices. 189 In spite of this knowledge of infringement, Visa continued to
provide the infringing websites with credit card services. 190 Because the
Stolen Content Websites infringed on Perfect 10’s right of distribution “by
sale,” “[it is] not possible to [infringe] by sale without receiving
compensation.” 191 Payment is therefore an essential element of infringement
by sale.192 By providing credit card services to websites who knowingly sell
infringing articles, the defendants make it substantially certain that these
services will be put to infringing uses, the very definition of contributory
copyright infringement.
The majority, however, seems to state that the existence of alternative
means of payment is a defense to contributory infringement.193 Even if this
were true, 194 there is little more than a hypothetical alternative to credit cards
for online payment. The main payment method for goods and services online
is, and has been since the inception of commercial activity online, the credit
card. 195 Not only are credit cards central to the ability to purchase goods
online, the amount of commerce being conducted online is growing
exponentially. Online sales for 2006 rose twenty-nine percent to about $146.4
billion, while sales forecasts for 2007 were expected to grow by nineteen

188. Id. at 800.
189. Id. at 793.
190. Id. at 792.
191. Id. at 814 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2000)).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text.
195. Timothy P. Lester, Globalized Automatic Choice of Forum: Where do Internet
Consumers Sue?, 9 NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 431, 461 (2003).
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percent to a whopping $174.5 billion. 196 The continuing reign of credit cards
as the most used form of payment online, along with the increasing size of
commercial activity being conducted online, demonstrates that the alternatives
the majority mentions are little more than hypothetical in the real world.
Another surprising aspect of this decision is that the Ninth Circuit’s
dismissal was not based upon a summary judgment motion or a verdict in the
district court, but upon a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.197 Under the Ninth
Circuit’s own precedent, the court should read the complaint liberally, taking
“[a]ll allegations of material fact . . . as true and construed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” 198 As Judge Kozinski notes in his dissent,
“I have never heard of reading a complaint liberally by ignoring allegations
that are clearly present.” 199 If the majority did apply a deferential standard to
the plaintiff’s complaint in this motion to dismiss, they made their deference
hard to find.
Yet another curious aspect of the Perfect 10 v. Visa decision is its reliance
on the policy rationale for not imposing contributory copyright liability. The
majority opinion relies too heavily on the reasoning behind Grokster,200
without taking account of the vast factual differences between the two
situations. In Grokster, the United States Supreme Court dealt with a product
that, if held liable for contributory copyright infringement, would virtually
foreclose an entire technological line of dissemination of ideas and products.
The main focus, as in Sony, was whether the product was “capable of
commercially significant noninfringing uses” 201 and whether they actively
promoted their product for infringing uses. 202 The Sony Court based their
decision on the public’s interest in access to the article of commerce in
question. 203 This analysis takes into account the risks of denying new
technological advancements due to possible infringing uses, where the entire
line of innovation might otherwise be foreclosed for fear of liability.
In Perfect 10 v. Visa, however, liability would not have foreclosed any
technological advancement. Visa’s credit card processing system would still
have been usable by every business in the world other than by direct infringers.

196. CNNMONEY.COM, Online Sales Spike 19 Percent, May 14, 2007, http://money.cnn.
com/2007/05/14/news/economy/online_retailing/index.htm.
197. Perfect 10 v. Visa, 494 F.3d at 792-93.
198. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009).
199. Perfect 10 v. Visa, 494 F.3d at 819 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 801.
201. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
202. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 940-41 (2005).
203. Sony, 464 U.S. at 440.
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While in Sony and Grokster the products (the video tape recorder and a peerto-peer file sharing program, respectively) are distributed to all consumers
either in violation of copyright law or not, the case is not the same in Perfect
10 v. Visa. Because there is less of a risk of stifling innovative technology in
Perfect 10 v. Visa than there was in Sony and Grokster, the court should have
taken this into consideration and given added weight to the incentive to stop
contributorily infringing activities.
One way the court in Perfect 10 v. Visa could have done this is by adopting
Judge Posner’s balancing approach taken in the In re Aimster Copyright
Litigation case. 204
In that case, Judge Posner looked beyond mere
noninfringing uses, holding that “[e]ven when there are noninfringing uses of
[a product or] service . . . to avoid liability as a contributory infringer the
provider of the service must show that it would have been disproportionately
costly for him to eliminate or at least reduce substantially the infringing
uses.” 205
This cost-balancing approach makes sense in Perfect 10 v. Visa. There is
no indication given by Visa or Mastercard that it would have been
disproportionately costly to eliminate or at least reduce substantially the
infringing uses. Once the credit card companies had actual knowledge of the
infringing uses of one of their customers, the only real cost to eliminate those
uses is their loss of profit from engaging in infringing activity. Under Posner’s
balancing test, the credit card companies could not show any disproportionate
costs for helping to protect the interests of copyright holders on the Internet.
However one approaches the holding in Perfect 10 v. Visa, the majority
appears to take great pains in attempting to reconcile their decision with prior
case law.206 Because much of the majority’s reasoning rests with public policy
and economics, it is important to determine whether the decision is grounded,
not only in a faithful application of prior case law, but also in the underlying
principles to which the majority refers.
B. Public Policy Behind the Rules
In Sony, the United States Supreme Court articulated a simple maxim:
“[w]hen technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the

204. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003).
205. Id. at 653 (emphasis added).
206. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv., Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 797-98 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting
in detail how the majority’s analysis “is fully consistent with this court’s recent decision in
Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com” and stating in five paragraphs of discussion how the holding “is also
fully consistent with and supported by this court’s previous holdings in Fonovisa and
Napster.”).
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Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose.” 207 As the
Court also noted, “[t]he immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a
fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor.” 208 Through securing a fair return
on the author’s creative labor, the basic purpose of copyright protection is to
stimulate creativity for the general public good.209 The decision of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Perfect 10 v. Visa does not promote the ultimate
goals of copyright protection, and thus is contrary to the policy principles
underlying copyright protection itself.
If Perfect 10 v. Visa foreshadows the direction of copyright law in the
future, it is a bleak future indeed. Authors will have little to no recourse
available to infringing activities online and less incentive to create new works
without a fair return on their labor. The lack of an effective copyright regime
makes direct infringers ignorant at best, and disdainful at worst, of copyright
law in general. 210 Also, the immense number of direct infringers compared to
the relatively small number of copyright holders leads infringers to discount
the possibility of being sued, thus taking away another important
mechanism—the fear of legal action—from the copyright law regime.211
These disdainful and fearless infringers will make authors think twice before
expending their own talent and energy to create a work that can so easily be
infringed by others.
As Justice Stevens noted in Sony:
The fortunes of the law of copyright have always been closely
connected with freedom of expression, on the one hand, and with
technological improvements . . . on the other. Successive ages have
drawn different balances among the interest of the writer in the
control and exploitation of his intellectual property, the related
interest of the publisher, and the competing interest of society in
the untrammeled dissemination of ideas.212
No doubt this is a difficult balancing process, especially in such a fastchanging technological age. However, when the courts reduce copyright
protection to “mere words” with no feasible means of effectuating
enforcement, the balance of interest has gone too far in the protection of
infringers.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 432.
Id.
Id.
See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 645.
Id.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 n.12 (quoting William C. Warren, Forward to BENJAMIN
KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT vii-viii (1967)).
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
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C. Economic Principles in Contributory Copyright Infringement
Not only does the court’s decision in Perfect 10 v. Visa undermine the
public policy behind copyright law, it also fails to make economic sense. By
disallowing Perfect 10 to prosecute a claim of contributory copyright
infringement against those indirectly assisting in the blatant infringement of
their copyrights, the court has given them no recourse outside of a suit against
the direct infringers. But is this a real alternative for copyright owners?
History has shown that copyright owners will always bring suit to protect
their ownership rights when new technologies and modes of infringement are
created.213 But in light of the increasing speed of technology for infringement
and the inability of the law to sufficiently guard against all of these new
developments, many infringers are effectively judgment-proof, limiting the
ability of copyright owners to pursue direct infringers.214
In Perfect 10 v. Visa, the direct infringers were “numerous websites based
in several countries” outside of the United States.215 It is often impossible for
copyright owners to successfully pursue foreign direct infringers online.216
Even if possible, the sheer number of small scale direct infringers online
would make individual suits against each of them extremely impractical. As
Judge Posner surmised, realizing “the impracticability or futility of a copyright
owner’s suing a multitude of individual infringers (‘chasing individual
consumers is time consuming and is a teaspoon solution to an ocean
problem’), the law allows a copyright holder to sue a contributor to the
infringement instead.” 217
By taking away this avenue that the law has traditionally used to help
copyright owners protect their interests, the Ninth Circuit has left Perfect 10
with only the option of a suit against the direct infringers. Recovery or
deterrence against such direct infringers is often impossible, or at least
extremely difficult and costly. The ability to sue indirect infringers, such as
213. Todd Ryan Hambidge, Note, Containing Online Copyright Infringement: Use of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Foreign Site Provision to Block U.S. Access to Infringing
Foreign Websites, 60 VAND. L. REV. 905, 929 (2007).
214. Glatstein, supra note 5, at 1626.
215. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv., Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 2007).
216. Glatstein, supra note 5, at 1626 (“[N]ew technologies that mask the identity of direct
infringers may make recovery and deterrence against direct infringers impossible, or at least
extremely difficult and costly. In the arena of digital copyright infringement, many users are
judgment-proof, effectively limiting the ability of standard copyright law to deter their
behavior.” (footnote omitted)).
217. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted)
(quoting Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47
ANTITRUST BULL. 423, 442 (2002)).
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Visa and Mastercard, who make online infringement either possible or
profitable, “allows copyright holders to stop direct infringement by millions
through one suit, rather than through millions of individual suits.” 218 By
failing to give copyright holders this option, the Ninth Circuit has indeed
“ma[de] some very new—and very bad—law.” 219
The lack of a real recourse against copyright infringement in the courts
could also lead to larger societal and economic problems. Besides merely
limiting copyright holders’ ability to find financial success in infringement
suits, this lack of legal recourse could cause a loss of investment in innovative
ideas and technologies. If investors fear that any innovations in which they
invest will be stolen by judgment-proof infringers, many will forgo investment
out of fear that they will not be protected from theft. In other words, few
companies would be willing to invest money into research and development
or the gathering of copyrighted works just to have a competitor contributorily
infringe on their new copyrighted materials. This is a serious and potentially
far reaching effect of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Perfect 10 v. Visa.
V. Conclusion
As is always the case in copyright law, it is difficult to “balance incentives
for creativity against social demand for access to artistic expression.” 220 For
years, the courts have been forced to change their approaches to this issue as
emerging technologies have changed and new methods of infringement have
been developed. However, it is in the public interest to ensure that copyrights
are protected. Without vigilant copyright protection, creative minds will be
disinclined to continue producing works that benefit society as a whole, as the
production of these works becomes less profitable.
To some, the tasks of the courts in copyright law and Sisyphus in Greek
mythology221 might seem equally hopeless. No matter how close the courts
get, emerging technology continues to outpace the law.222 Despite this
challenge, the courts must continue to balance the interests of authors,
publishers, and society at large with each new emerging technology. In order
218. Hambidge, supra note 213, at 929.
219. Perfect 10 v. Visa, 494 F.3d at 814 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
220. Andres Sawicki, Comment, Repeat Infringement in the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1455 (2006).
221. Katherine R. Kruse, Race, Angst, and Capital Punishment: The Burger Court’s
Existential Struggle, 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 67, 116 (1998) (“[In Greek mythology,]
Sisyphus was cursed by the gods to roll a heavy rock to the top of a mountain. Every time
Sisyphus reached the top of the mountain, the rock would roll back down. For all eternity,
Sisyphus was condemned to engage in this ‘futile and hopeless labor.’” (citation omitted)).
222. See Flate, supra note 16, at 188.
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for the United States to continue promoting “the Progress of Science and
useful Arts” 223 in this age of global innovation, the courts must continue to
meet this challenge.
James M. Tilly

223. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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